Department of BioEngineering

Nagaoka University of Technology

Nagaoka 940-21, Japan

e-mail: kmatsuno@vos.nagaokaut.ac.jp

Keywords: Causality, Communication, Context, Final Cause, Mechanistic Cause

Causation is more than just a philosophical issue. In particular, mechanistic causation specifying how each individual could be related to itself and all of the others at a preceding stage remains unproblematic. The movement of each individual is acted upon by others. However, we also have much stronger form of mechanistic causality amounting to asserting that the movement of each individual is uniquely determined by others from moment to moment. This observation suggests to us to examine how mechanistic causality could function in reality. The present problem cannot be a minor one especially in view of the fact that mechanistic causality in the sense of being acted upon by others is ubiquitous in any adaptive and evolutionary systems we meet in our empirical world. We shall address ourselves to the issue of how causality could function in materializing natural systems with a special focus upon mechanistic causality.

We usually take mechanistic causality to be of a one-to-one temporal mapping connecting an arbitrary predecessor to its successor expressed in the present tense. Newtonian equation of motion is a well known representative of mechanistic causality of unique specification. The mechanistic equation of motion certainly specifies how each individual constituting the equation develops in time. At the same time, the mechanistic equation of motion is subject to a constraint coming from the context denoted as the initial conditions. It can be of no use unless it is supplemented by the causation from the context. The present interplay between causation towards each individual and causation from the context as a vehicle of modeling natural systems comes to impart to the mechanistic equation of motion a unique property. Extreme sensitivity to initial conditions reveal a pathological dependence of the mechanistic equation on the context. A slightest deviation in the context may bring about an enormous difference in the behaviors that the equation of motion would exhibit. This pathological sensitivity to the context is not something to be expected of natural systems, since in the latter a significant capacity of homeostasis resisting variations originating in the context, that is, the environment, is usually guaranteed. Newtonian equation of motion cannot become a suitable model describing the behavior of natural systems because of its pathological sensitivity to the context.

The pathological sensitivity will more significantly be enhanced if Maxwell’s equation of electromagnetic field in three dimensional space is the case, since the context is specified by its boundary conditions in space and time. The context towards Maxwell’s equation is materialized in essence in two forms of potential; one is the retarded potential, and one more is the advanced one. Although it may be relatively easier to prepare a boundary condition corresponding to the retarded potential giving rise to an expanding electromagnetic wave because of the relative smallness of the number of degrees of freedom to be controlled, the case for the advanced potential yielding a contracting wave in three dimensional space is practically impossible because of the presence of an immense number of degrees of freedom to be tamed technically. Difficulty in fabricating the context upon the electromagnetic field especially in terms of the advanced potential may render the notion of boundary conditions even irrelevant.

In contrast, the wavefunction of the Schroedinger’s equation of motion in quantum mechanics makes the notion of the context amenable to physical processes taking place there. Coexistence of the wavefunctions propagating in opposite directions in fact generates a standing wavefunction corresponding to the occurrence of an eigen-wavefunction that remains non-propagative. Empirical stability of a quantum state denoted as the standing wavefunction certainly manifests a likelihood of physical conditions giving rise to such a context allowing the wavefunctions to propagate in opposite directions equally. The existence of a standing wavefunction is due to the interference between two types of wavefunction; one is propagating in the forward direction in time and the other in the backward. The context being responsible for the genesis of a standing wavefunction actually admits two types of causation; one is forward in time and the other is backward. As a matter of fact, the stability of a quantum state against its context is due to juxtaposition of both the forward and the backward causations. The present stabilization of dynamics eliminating pathological sensitivity to the context is actually confirmed by conceiving an arbitrary dynamics carrying causations both in the forward and backward directions in time (Dubois, 1996). Causation in the backward is in essence seen as a causation from the context since it can be regarded as a reflection of the preceding forward causation at a certain boundary forming the context. Reflected forward causation thus carries with itself the capacity of changing the boundary conditions or the context to be experienced by each individual.

Occurrence of backward causation in time provides a new perspective towards the principle of causation. When it is contrasted to absolute freedom, causality is antithetical to absolute freedom. However, this contrast is not mutually exclusive. If everything is claimed to follow causality in one way or another, the question would arise as to what could be the cause of causality. Impossibility in answering this question properly would come to vindicate absolute freedom for the sake of the cause of causality. On the other hand, if it is claimed that there is room for absolute freedom to survive, one would necessarily come up with the presence of a stage prior to the action of exercising such an absolute freedom. But, the concatenation between the irrelevant prior stage and the activity of exercising absolute freedom subsequently would come to destroy the whole notion of causality. If causality is to be vindicated, there would be no room for absolute freedom. The present Kantian antinomy between causality and absolute freedom can be resolved only by supposing that the dichotomy of causality and absolute freedom is a false one. Causation can carry with itself some form of freedom or indefiniteness (Matsuno, 1989). This recognition of indefiniteness being compatible with the operation of causation suggests to us a possibility of accommodating the backward causation in time to the forward one properly.

Causation propagating in the backward in time is however metaphorical at best, since every dynamic is actualized in the process of transferring the present progressive to the present perfect. Causation from the context towards each individual is always of a retarded character. Individualization associated with causation towards each individual is mechanistic in securing the causes in the preceding context. Furthermore, each individual subject to causation from the preceding context in turn comes to constitute the subsequent context. Such a contextualization is to come with causation from the context. The coexistence of both individualization and contextualization is thus seen as a necessary outcome from the indefiniteness latent in the principle of causation. Contextualization proceeding in the forward direction in time is in fact equivalent to preparing an updated context that would come to act upon each individual subsequently. This type of retardation of causation materializes in the form of contextualization. Unless individualization of mechanistic causation is stipulated to be completely determinate with regard to every participant, there always remains room for contextualization. What is more, it is rather erroneous to assert that there is no room of indefiniteness in the name of the principle of causation because the dichotomy of causation and absolute freedom is a false one. The present interplay between individualization and contextualization will provides a new perspective towards the principle of causation.

Despite the false dichotomy between causation and absolute freedom, mechanistic causality has long set a stipulation such that every individual would move strictly in a deterministic manner once individualization of causation is assumed to be complete. This is the case with Newtonian equation of motion. Once mechanistic causality acting on each individual is declared to be complete and to carry with itself no indefiniteness, there would be no need to refer to the context. Each individual constituting the context is supposed to be in complete conformity with all of the others from the start. Newtonian equation of motion presumes complete synchronization between individualization and contextualization of causation. A consequence of this queer stipulation is, however, a pathological dependency to the context such that the behaviors exhibited by a Newtonian equation may become extremely sensitive even to a slightest change in the context. The present pathological situation in its effect would come to legitimately question the likelihood of complete synchronization between individualization and contextualization of causation.

Of course, pathological sensitivity to the context is not everywhere in the world of Newtonian equations of motion. In case such a pathological sensitivity is absent, the likelihood of synchronization between individualization and contextualization could hold. Take, for instance, a stable quantum state expressed as a standing wavefunction subject to Schroedinger equation of motion. The occurrence of a standing wavefunction manifests that both the wavefunction propagating in the forward direction consisting of each individual and the one propagating in the backward coming from the context are synchronized with each other, with the consequence of no net propagative behavior. However, such a synchronization is a theoretical artifact at best even if it may have a well-suited empirical counterpart. There should be a legitimate possibility such that a synchronization between individualization and contextualization may sometimes be a good approximation to a reality, but it cannot be the reality itself. At issue is whether there could be a case questioning the occurrence of synchronization between individualization and contextualization. One can expect to find helpful examples in the realm of biological phenomena.

Bacterium E. coli moves towards an attractant such as glucose if available. The presence or absence of attractants sets the context under which an E. coli behaves individually. The causation for moving to an attractant comes from the context. In this setting, a stressful situation to the E. coli would come up when the attractant it feeds on is depleted. The bacterium starts tumbling its body until it find the direction along which the concentration of attractants increases. What is intriguing at this point is how each of the bacterium and its context could contribute to the tumbling movement. The context surrounding the bacterium provides an impetus for initiating the tumbling movement. That is a causation towards an individual from the context. Needless to say, such an individualization of causation is mechanistic in specifying how the bacterium would make its movement. At the same time, the individualization could not synchronize with its contextualization until the bacterium would finally find itself directed towards where attractants are located. The causation coming from the context does not necessarily suit to the context on the spot. It is only when the bacterium senses the direction along which the concentration of attractants increases that both individualization and contextualization are synchronized.

Individualization of causation is in fact an instance of making distinction in which the activity of making distinction is taken for granted. The origin of such an activity rests upon the absence of synchronization between individualization and contextualization since causation is taken to come from the context. If the preceding individualization fails to fit into the context for whatever reasons, the context would suffer variations accordingly and then the subsequent causation from the context would be varied. This sort of variations is certainly in accord with the principle of causation setting a stipulation connecting the context to each individual constituent. Mechanistic causation is arguably an extreme case guaranteeing a unique relationship of causation between the context and its every individual constituent. Such a determinate relationship could become most visible when the condition of ceteris paribus in one form or another is imposed (Matsuno, 1993). Nonetheless, the principle of causation abandons completely synchronized determination of the relationship between the whole context and its every individual constituent. Still, insofar as the principle is respected, the integrity of the context would have to be observed. The principle of causation requires the agency of contextualization more than anything else. If the preceding individualization fails to fit into the then existing context, a subsequent contextualization would necessarily follow, with a consequence of updating the context serving as the agency of supplying further causes of individualization. This sequence can continue indefinitely.

The principle of causation necessarily comes to incorporate into itself the capacity of searching, modifying and accommodating to the context. The activity of accommodating to the context in the form of contextualization is unquestionably self-reflexive and final in maintaining the capacity of behaving for the sake of the context. Despite the final mode of activity, however, the principle makes both mechanistic and final modes of activity mutually commensurable. Unless mechanistic causality employs a form of ceteris paribus enforcing a unique determination of the relationship between the context and its individual constituent, every caused movement holds the capacity of accommodating itself to the context. Otherwise, the principle of causation would fail to hold. Contextualization of each individual comes from the principle of causation. The tumbling movement of a bacterium E. coli is certainly a case exhibiting an activity of contextualization on the part of the individual. The inseparable tie between individualization and contextualization can be much more enhanced if the actor happens to be a human being.

In July 1969, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States succeeded in launching the Apollo Eleven intended for soft landing of human astronauts on the lunar surface and their safe return to the Earth. At the helm of the lunar soft landing craft was captain Neil Armstrong. Until the last minutes of landing on the moon surface, the reverse propulsion and the attitude control of the landing craft were automated without having an intervention of manual control. However, captain Armstrong finally took over the handling of the control stick manually just before the landing. The context towards the captain was to achieve soft landing on the moon surface, and nothing more. The manual maneuvering of the control stick was caused by the context specifying the relationship between the landing craft in flight and the conditions of the intended landing site on the moon. What the captain was doing over his control stick was to contexualize his maneuvering so as to accommodate the landing craft to its soft landing. Every maneuvering of the control stick was under the contextualization. Individualization of each manual control over the stick remained inseparable from its contextualization until the craft safely landed on the moon. What was significant at this point was that individualization of causation towards how to manually control the handling stick was already concomitant with the capacity of contextualization towards how to make the context.

Manual control over the handling stick is more than what the automated control by a machine would imply. Of course, it goes without saying that the control by a machine can be implemented by mechanistic causation in one form or another. Mechanistic causation will be versatile in materializing the movement of each individual constituent insofar as the contextualization is not seriously taken into account. As a matter of fact, if non-reflexive causation is taken primary, mechanistic causation could be regarded as the rule. Machines are built on the premise that they do not carry self-reflexive or self-referential capabilities on their own. Once a structured organization happens to carry such a self-reflexive capacity, it could not be a machine to be designed and fabricated accordingly, any more. This is because the capacity of self-reflection implies carrying a certain extent of indefiniteness that would persistently defy to be identified in a perspicuous manner. Being susceptible to the self-reflection requires further capacity of maintaining such a context that it may change itself as responding to the causation originating from the preceding context. If the response is pre-programmable, both individualization and contextualization could completely be synchronized and there would be no room of invoking further causation towards the context. Admitting the room of indefiniteness that cannot be pre-programmed is antithetical to designing a machine that remains programmable in principle.

The manually controlled landing craft was competent enough to extract the force to influence the current context from the preceding one, while the machine-automated one was so constrained as only to be subject to causation from the context in a pre-programmed manner. The difference was whether the capacity of making distinction could also be with the machine-automated landing craft. In fact, the capacity of making distinction is prior to any causation towards each individual in eliminating all of the other possible caused movements. What is crucial here is whether individual alternatives could be categorized in advance. The machine-automated landing craft was so designed that it could follow the if-then sequence of identifying the context and acting upon the latter. The if-then scheme of operational procedure took the presence of definite descriptive categories for granted well in advance even before the actual launching of the Apollo Eleven from the Earth. In contrast, the landing craft controlled manually by captain Armstrong was not asked to follow a pre-determined set of categories to describe the context on the spot. The only assignment was to achieve a safe landing. What was required to the captain was to exercise this capacity of making distinction over handling the control stick so as to achieve the landing in the end. It was not required to categorize the context from moment to moment. Unless we are stipulated to observe the context in a categorized manner before making every commitment to it, there must be no separation between individualization and contextualization of causation as with the case of a tumbling bacterium E. coli.

Following Aristotle’s initiative, mechanistic causality has long taken to be antithetical to final causality. The swing of the pendulum between the two has overly been deflected towards mechanistic causality since the upheaval of Galilean-Newtonian physics. This overwhelming domination of mechanistic causality is, at least historically, quite understandable if one takes it for granted that both causation and caused movement can be explicated in a perspicuous manner. The present descriptive stipulation in turn forces us to accept a definite set of descriptive categories. The presence of definitive categories, when combined with the principle of causation, could come to assert that causation from the context, whatever it may be, can be definitely identifiable and accordingly there would be no room for it to be varied in an unprecedented manner. Complete categorical specification of the context would then eliminate any possibility for the individualization of causation to influence the existing context. There could be no need to having recourse to contextualization. Everything could be taken to follow mechanistic causation. Nonetheless, the presence of definitive descriptive categories remains as a methodological artifact at best. Although such categories would enable us to describe a definitive object outside and its mechanistic dynamics, there is no guarantee for that such would be the case in reality. A more modest attitude towards the problem of causation is to have certain reservation with our apparent confidence on descriptive categories.

Once we set ourselves free from the strict stipulation of definitive categories and admit that they are still incomplete, a totally different towards the issue of causation will come up. In particular, it is quite natural to observe that making distinction is far more ubiquitous in our empirical world compared to making categorization in terms of definitive categories. Making categorization is only a special case of making distinction. When it is combined with the principle of causation, the capacity of making distinction will certainly operate in the process of individualization of causation. What is more, there is no pre-determined guarantee for that the distinction made for the individualization may also satisfy the condition for contextualization. Making distinction is an activity encompassing both individualization and contextualization of causation. When we refer to the contextualization of causation as an instance of final causality, a key to this observation is our reservation such that our descriptive categories are still changing in time and cannot remain definitive.

Of course, we have witnessed a strong argument for asking that there must be a definite set of descriptive categories in order to complete our recognition of the outside world. Despite this strong assertion, however, there is a sharp difference between simply asking categorized perception of the outside world and justifying it. Final causality lives up with contextualization of causation insofar as the capacity of making distinction is taken to be primary.

Dubois, D. M., 1996. Introduction to the Aristotle’s final causation in CAST: concept and method of